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Abstract David Lewis’s latest theory of causation defines the causal link in terms
of the relation of influence between events. It turns out, however, that one event’s
influencing another is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for its being a
cause of that event. In the article one particular case of causality without influence is
presented and developed. This case not only serves as a counterexample to Lewis’s
influence theory, but also threatens earlier counterfactual analyses of causation by
admitting a particularly troublesome type of preemption. The conclusion of the
article is that Lewis’s influence method of solving the preemption problem fails, and
that we need a new and fresh approach to the cases of redundant causation if we
want to hold on to the counterfactual analysis of causation.
1 Introduction
David Lewis’s counterfactual analysis of causation started off inconspicuously as a
modest alternative to the dominating regularity approach, but it soon grew into the
mainstay of modern philosophy of causation, overshadowing its regularity rival.
What may come as a surprise (but only a mild one, given the nature of philosophical
investigations) is the fact that Lewis’s approach owes its enormous popularity not
only to its successes, which are unquestionable, but first and foremost to the number
of problems it creates. Since its conception in the seventies, the counterfactual
analysis of causation has been subjected to a tremendous amount of critical analysis
from various authors, even including Lewis himself. Under this pressure the
counterfactual theory has undergone substantial transformations, modifications, and
amendments, and these changes in turn have elicited even more sophisticated
counterexamples and objections. Although not all of Lewis’s off-hand attempts to
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overcome numerous obstacles have withstood the test of time, some of them have
given rise to better developed alternatives, of which the most recent is the influence
theory of causation that appeared in print in 2000, 1 year prior to his untimely death.
It has to be noted that Lewis’s last word on the issue of causality did not escape the
fate of his earlier analyses—the criticism leveled against the influence theory of
causation is no less intense than that directed against its predecessors, and we can
only regret that it won’t be met with Lewis’s sharp and witty responses.
The purpose of this paper is primarily to discuss one particular counterexample to
Lewis’s latest theory of causation. The counterexample that will be subsequently
analyzed in the paper has some interesting features that set it apart from typical
examples known in the literature.1 First of all, the same single case with only slight
modifications can serve as a falsifier of virtually every earlier version of Lewis’s
counterfactual theory, including the variants rejected by Lewis himself. The required
modifications involve preempted backup causes, and it turns out that this new type of
preemption is particularly resistant to the standard available methods of dealing with
redundant causation. This fact dashes any hope of quickly saving the counterfactual
analysis by adopting either a simple or qualified ‘disjunctive approach’, according to
which each definition (or modification thereof) given by Lewis can serve as a partial
analysis of causation, applicable in certain circumstances where others may fail.2
Moreover, the counterexample selected for analysis in this paper is astonishingly
simple—one may even call it embarrassingly simplistic. It does not involve any
potentially objectionable elements such as omissions, preventers, magical spells,
science-fiction contraptions, quantum non-local interactions, etc., that pervade the
current literature on the subject. Thanks to this feature the counterexample cannot be
lightly dismissed, as the intuitive judgment on which it rests is virtually unassailable.
But even more significantly, the example selected as a trouble-maker to Lewis’s
theory turns out to belong to an important subcategory of causation that is quite
common in the physical world, and yet to my knowledge has not received the
required share of attention. I base this judgment on the fact that this particular
subcategory of causal connections between events seems to falsify not only Lewis’s
analysis of causation, but also some of the approaches that promise to take physical
causality seriously, such as Salmon’s or Dowe’s analyses in terms of the transfer of
a conserved quantity. Finally, the supplied example has the potential to shed new
light on the distinction between causal factors and causal conditions.
But first let us give a whirlwind presentation of the main developments in the
turbulent history of the counterfactual approach to causation.3 The entire adventure
1 An anonymous referee has pointed out that an example virtually identical to the one I develop in Sect. 3
has been mentioned in the book (Schwarz 2009, p. 144). I do not wish to make any claim of authorship of
this example, but I would like to make it clear that at the time of writing the first version of this paper in
2008 I did not know about Schwarz’s important book. I am grateful to the referee for correcting my
oversight.
2 It has to be noted that Lewis himself was skeptical about the theoretical advantages of the disjunctive
approach to causality (Lewis 2004, p. 76).
3 Two fundamental texts that laid the foundations for the modern counterfactual theory of causation are




began with the simple analysis based on the notion of counterfactual dependence.
Stripped down to its bare essentials the simple counterfactual analysis stipulates that
an actual event c is a cause of another actual event e distinct from c in case it is true
that were c not to occur, e would not occur either. However, such a definition is
unable to ensure the transitivity of the causal relation due to the fact that
counterfactual conditionals do not satisfy the law of transitivity. For that reason
Lewis decided to define the causal relation as the ancestral of the relation of
counterfactual dependence. This amendment helped Lewis deal with the first serious
challenge to his theory, namely the case of early preemption.
Early preemption involves two (potential) causes c1 and c2 of an event e such that
the occurrence of one of them (let’s say c1) not only causes e to occur, but also cuts
off the causal chain that leads from c2 to the same effect e. As a result, c2 becomes a
preempted potential cause, whereas c1 remains an actual cause of e. However, it is
not true that had c1 not occurred, e would not have happened, for in such a case
e would have been produced by the backup cause c2. Lewis solves this problem
neatly by singling out an intermediate event d in the chain of events connecting c1
with e, such that d occurs after c2 has been preempted. In such a case we can argue
that d is counterfactually dependent on c1, while e is counterfactually dependent on
d, hence the amended definition is satisfied.4 Note that to secure the truth of the
counterfactual *O(d) h? *O(e) we have to assume that so-called backtracking
counterfactuals are not allowed, in order to forestall the argument that if d had not
happened, c1 must not have happened, and therefore c2 would have happened. Given
this anti-backtracking assumption, Lewis’s analysis seems to easily clear the first
hurdle. But there is more to come.
A more threatening challenge, which ultimately led to the downfall of the
ancestral-of-the-counterfactual-dependence analysis, is the case of late preemption.
In this case c1 does not preempt c2 until e is produced, which makes it too late to use
the trick with the intermediate event d. The following standard example can
illustrate this situation: two children, Suzy and Billy, are throwing rocks at a bottle,
but Suzy throws her rock a moment earlier than Billy, and therefore it is her rock
and not Billy’s that shatters the bottle. However, until Suzy’s rock shatters the bottle
Billy’s flying rock threatens to produce the same effect. Hence there is not a
moment before the shattering of the bottle when we could truthfully say ‘‘Had
Suzy’s rock not been on its way, the bottle would not have shattered’’.
Lewis considered several possible strategies to deal with this obstinate case. For
some time his preferred solution was based on the notion of quasi-dependence.
Lewis noticed that there are intrinsic copies of the entire causal chain leading from
Suzy’s throw to the bottle’s shattering for which the counterfactual dependence of
the effect on the cause is preserved—these are namely situations in which Billy is
out of the picture. Due to the existence of such an intrinsic copy with the
counterfactual dependence, we can call the relation between the bottle’s actual
shattering and Suzy’s actual throw ‘‘quasi-dependence’’, and Lewis stipulates that
this relation should be sufficient for causation to occur. However, later he
4 Of course this solution is not available to the prominent group of philosophers who deny that causation
is transitive. See e.g. (Hall 2000) and a response given in (Lewis 2004).
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abandoned this solution, apparently as a result of insurmountable problems it
entailed.
Critics have pointed out that it is possible to find cases in which an intrinsic
copy of a causal chain with counterfactual dependence is not itself causal, thus
refuting Lewis’s claim on which the purported solution rests.5 To that we may add
that if the notion of quasi-dependence is meant to serve as part of the definition of
the causal relation, then this clearly leads to circularity, as quasi-dependence in
turn is based on the notion of causal chains. And it looks like the reference to a
causal chain, and not to any other chain (for instance a spatiotemporally
contiguous one), in the definition of quasi-dependence is unavoidable, otherwise
we would have a problem of how to exclude the preempted cause from the process
whose intrinsic copy is supposed to display the counterfactual dependence between
the cause and the effect.
Another possible way of dealing with the late preemption case, briefly examined
by Lewis but quickly dismissed, is the solution based on the notion of fragile events.
Lewis observes that strictly speaking the shattering of the bottle by Suzy’s rock is
not identical in every respect with the shattering caused by Billy, as either rock was
thrown from a slightly different direction, possibly at a different speed, angle, etc.
Hence if we adopted very strict criteria of identity for the actual event of the bottle’s
shattering, we could claim that without Suzy’s throw this particular event of
shattering would not have happened, although a very similar one would have taken
place instead. This solution presupposes that events are very fragile entities, as a
seemingly insignificant change in a given event’s properties could result in its
‘destruction’ and the subsequent creation of a numerically different event. But
Lewis points out that the proposed medicine is worse than the disease, as it leads to
an enormous proliferation of spurious causes. Fragile events are counterfactually
dependent on numerous earlier occurrences, the majority of which are not
intuitively considered genuine causes. For instance, in the case of Suzy’s throw, a
slight gust of wind could minimally affect the trajectory of the rock and thus the
pattern of the shattering, and that fact leads to the desperate conclusion that if the
wind had not blown, the shattering (as it happened) would not have occurred. Faced
with such a consequence, Lewis unsurprisingly abandons the strategy based on the
5 McDermott (1995) gives such an example involving double prevention: stopping a mad American
President from initiating a nuclear conflict with the Soviet Union is a cause of an ordinary Joe Blow’s
eating his breakfast the next morning, as it prevents Soviet missiles from preventing the breakfast. But
McDermott observes that an intrinsic copy of all relevant events in America does not constitute a causal
chain in the world in which Russia is uninhabited or in which all Russian nuclear missiles are made of
papier-maˆche´. However, it is not exactly clear to me why the actual conditions in Russia are to be
excluded from the entire causal chain leading from the restraining of the crazed President to Joe Blow’s
breakfast. I believe that intrinsicness is an altogether different concept than locality or contiguity. An
intrinsic copy of a process has to share with it all non-relational properties of the original process, but the
process itself may consist of spatiotemporally separated elements (conditions). To put it differently, the
state of alertness of the military in Russia may be extraneous to what is happening in America, but is not
an extrinsic matter with respect to the connection between the restraining and the breakfast. Other
counterexamples to the quasi-dependence theory are presented by Lewis himself in (2004, pp. 83–85). I
believe all of them can raise legitimate questions, but I will not pursue this matter any further.
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notion of fragility.6 The only reason I mention this ill-conceived solution to the late
preemption worry is that it ultimately gave rise to a better conception based on the
notion of influence. Interestingly, however, some critics maintain that similar
examples of spurious causality may also affect the latter proposal. We will return to
this shortly.
Even the fragility solution is unable to solve yet another conundrum affecting the
counterfactual analysis of causation, known as ‘trumping preemption’. In this case
we are supposed to imagine a major and a sergeant shouting the same order to a
soldier. The soldier carries out the order, but given the hierarchy of military ranks it
is natural to assume that it was the major’s and not the sergeant’s order that
ultimately caused the soldier’s action. But even assuming that the soldier’s action is
a fragile event it is difficult to argue that if the major had not shouted the command,
the executing of the order would be numerically different from the actual one.7
Lewis ultimately admitted that his early counterfactual analysis is unable to cope
with this problem, and therefore he decided to try a new approach, using the notion
of influence.
2 The Influence Theory of Causation
Lewis’s earlier analysis of causality focuses exclusively on one type of counter-
factual dependence between events: the so-called whether–whether dependence. But
there are other types of dependence, not limited to the crude all-or-nothing
dependence of occurrences. For instance, we can speak about when–when
dependence, when-whether dependence, and the broader how–how dependence.
Generally, not only the existence of one event may depend on the existence of
another event, but also the time and manner of the occurrence of one of them can
counterfactually depend on the time and manner of the occurrence of the other.
6 A noteworthy attempt to revive the fragility solution has been made by Coady (2004). He defends a
position according to which in the real world there exist both fragile and robust versions of common
events. The expression ‘‘the shattering of the bottle’’ is ambiguous, as it can refer either to a fragile or a
robust event. When we say that Suzy’s throw was a cause of the shattering, we interpret the shattering as a
fragile event and thus we accept the counterfactual dependence between it and the throw. On the other
hand, the robust shattering is counterfactually dependent on both throws taken jointly, but it doesn’t admit
spurious causation. Coady considers and repels various objections to his solution, including the charge of
an unnecessary multiplication of distinct events. While unquestionably interesting, Coady’s solution has
some obvious shortcomings. It is far from clear that the statement giving the causal explanation of the
shattering is indeed considered ambiguous in natural language. Coady claims that there are contexts in
which it is intuitively acceptable to deny that Suzy’s throw alone caused the shattering, but I simply don’t
see this. It seems to me that there is only one natural answer to the question ‘‘What caused the
shattering?’’, where the shattering is understood in the most general and unspecific way, and the answer is
unambiguously ‘‘Suzy’s throw did that’’.
7 Coady (2004) suggests a solution based on his distinction between fragile and robust versions of the
major’s order. If we interpret the major’s order as a fragile event, then the closest possible world in which
this particular order does not exist is arguably not a world in which the major does not give any order, but
a world in which the major gives a slightly different order. In such a world the soldier will obey the
major’s new order, and thus the counterfactual dependence between the soldier’s action and the major’s
order is restored.
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These loose thoughts can be given a more rigorous explication with the help of
Lewis’s notion of influence (Lewis 2000, 2004).
Lewis stipulates that an event c influences an event e if and only if there is a
substantial range Rc of different not-too-distant alterations of c and a range Re of
alterations of e, such that each alteration of e within Re is counterfactually
dependent on some alteration of c from Rc. And by an alteration of an event x Lewis
understands either a very fragile version of x or a very fragile alternative event that
is similar to x but numerically different. The idea of introducing the notion of
alteration comes from the unsuccessful attempt to solve the problem of late
preemption by making the effect a fragile event. Lewis does not want to commit
himself to the interpretation of actual events which makes them excessively fragile,
but instead introduces an array of extra non-actual and fragile events that ‘surround’
the actual one. The fact that those extra events may or may not be seen as
numerically identical with the actual one reflects Lewis’s intention to leave the issue
of fragility of actual events open. His new approach to causality is supposed to be
neutral with respect to that problem.
Finally, Lewis stipulates in the standard fashion that the causal relation is the
ancestral of the relation of influence. Now we can see how the influence theory deals
with the problem of late preemption. When we consider Suzy’s throw, we can
introduce a set of possible events that are similar to the actual throw, but differ with
respect to some parameter, such as the exact time of the throw, the initial speed,
direction, the rotation of the rock, etc. And it turns out that to each such event there
corresponds a fragile alteration of the shattering of the bottle such that if the initial
event had not occurred, this particular alteration would not have occurred either. To
use Schaffer’s happy phrase, if we ‘wiggle’ Suzy’s throw a bit, the shattering will
wiggle accordingly. On the other hand, there is no such dependence between the
alterations of Billy’s rock and the alterations of the shattering. The time and manner
of Billy’s throw does not influence the time and manner of the shattering, at least not
in a significant way (we have to disregard effects such as the minute gravitational
impact of Billy’s rock on the bottle). In a similar way we can dissolve the problem
of trumping preemption, arguing that it is the major’s order and not the sergeant’s
that influences the soldier’s action.
However, one may point out that our analysis of Suzy and Billy’s target practice
was a bit biased toward the required solution. To see that let us assume that Billy’s
actual throw took place 1 s later than Suzy’s. Now, it can be claimed that in fact the
definition of influence is satisfied by the pair (Billy’s throw, the bottle’s shattering)
when we take the following set as the range of alterations of the first of the two
events: the set of Billy’s alternative throws that occurred more than a second prior to
the actual throw, and that differed slightly from the actual one with respect to some
other parameters. It is clear that this set is mapped onto appropriate alterations of the
shattering, for in this case it is Billy’s rock and not Suzy’s that reaches the bottle
first. Given the vagueness of Lewis’s phrase ‘‘not-too-distant alterations’’, a
reasonably strong case can be made for the conclusion that Billy’s throw influences




In order to avoid similar problems, Igal Kvart (2001) has proposed to make
Lewis’s concept of influence a bit more precise and accurate with the help of some
topological notions. The general idea is to prescribe that if there is a pattern of
influence between a range of alterations Rc that constitute a connected neighborhood
of the actual event c and a range of alterations Re, then if we take a narrower
connected neighborhood R0c included in Rc and still containing c, this pattern of
influence should not degenerate into a mapping that funnels all alterations from R0c
onto one actual event e. In other words, we should be able to make the alterations of
the cause c arbitrarily small, and still get non-trivial alterations of the effect. This
condition is arguably not satisfied in the case of Billy’s throw, because if we take a
sub-range of alterations of his throw whose time of occurrence deviates less than 1 s
from the actual event, then the pattern of influence will become degenerate (in that
case it is still Suzy’s rock that reaches the bottle first).
But even this correction to Lewis’s account does not eliminate all potential
troubles. Critics have been quick to point out other cases that apparently satisfy
Lewis’s definition and yet intuitively do not exemplify the causal relationship. Dowe
(2000a, b) for instance invokes examples of hasteners and delayers, i.e. events that
make another event occur earlier or later than it would have occurred otherwise, but
do not qualify as causes. An example of a delayer may be a rain that causes a
subsequent forest fire to occur later than it would have occurred without the rain.
Schaffer (2001) describes a case of an electrocution using a device that has two
controllers: one is a single on–off button, and the other is a complicated switchboard
that affects all parameters of the electrocution (its time, duration, the amount of the
flowing current, etc.) but does not turn on the device. Intuitively, only the operation
of the main button counts as a cause of the electrocution, but the relation of influence
clearly holds between the setting of the switchboard and the event of electrocution.
One possible response to these counterexamples is to concede, contrary to our
off-hand snap judgement, that they constitute legitimate cases of causation after all.
Lewis has already made one step toward broadening his notion of cause by
accepting causal conditions as genuine causes. If we agree that the presence of
oxygen is one of the causes of the forest fire, then what is wrong with saying that
even an earlier rain could have causally contributed to it? Of course rains are
generally not conducive to fires, as opposed to oxygen, but in one particular case a
rain can actually help a fire occur at a given time (rather than at another). But still,
we may wonder if this laxity in admitting diverse causes of a given event does not
go too far. Even Lewis was reluctant to accept a gust of wind as a cause of the
bottle’s shattering, or eating a big meal before taking a lethal dose of poison as a
cause of death. That is why he voted to reject the fragility solution to the problem of
late preemption. But now it seems that the same problem comes back again in his
own approach. Can’t we say that the gust of wind influences the shattering? After
all, if we consider alterations of this particular gust, then clearly they will be
mapped onto some minute alterations of the way the bottle shattered.
Still, the situation is far from being clear. The counterexamples presented so far
can certainly shake our confidence in the new theory of causation, but they fall short
of dealing a fatal blow. By adopting a certain threshold of what counts as a
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legitimate alteration of the effect we could try to eliminate most egregious cases
while leaving borderline cases as ‘spoils to the victor’. But the arsenal of
troublesome cases is not exhausted yet. We haven’t discussed yet apparent
situations in which we can have a causal relation without influence. Schaffer for
instance claims that in his electrocution device example pressing the button does not
stand in Lewis’s relation of influence to the electrocution. True, he admits that the
alterations of the time at which the device is turned on are associated with the
alterations of the time of the electrocution, but he insists that this when–when
dependence is not sufficient to satisfy Lewis’s definition of influence, as not a single
parameter of the electrocution other than its time depends on any parameters of
flipping the switch. But to forestall possible complaints he even modifies the entire
set-up in such a way that the change of the time of the switch’s flipping does not
produce the change of the timing of the electrocution. Although the situation
becomes more complicated because of that modification, the main goal seems to be
achieved—we have a case of a cause-and-effect link without a pattern of influence.
Kvart conceived of a similar example involving a high-tech modification of Suzy
and Billy’s target practice. Suppose that Suzy’s rock, rather than shattering the
bottle directly, sets off a complicated electronic detection device that is connected to
a small explosive attached to the bottle. Again, it can be claimed that no parameter
of the shattering caused by the explosion other than its time (and even this can be
eliminated) depends on any parameters of Suzy’s throw, but clearly Suzy’s throw is
a cause of the shattering. I believe that both Schaffer’s and Kvart’s examples raise a
legitimate question about whether the influence conception of causation is able to
account for all cases of causation that we are intuitively inclined to accept.8 But to
settle the issue decisively let us consider the following low-tech and run-of-the-mill
example.
3 The Railroad Switch Counterexample
Let us consider one of the simplest imaginable set-ups: a railroad track that splits
into two tracks, and a switch regulating the direction of train traffic. Suppose further
that one of the two tracks leads to a dead end, and that at 6:00 PM a passenger train
is supposed to pass this fork on the way to its destination. However, at 5:00 PM a
bad guy creeps in and changes the position of the switch by moving the mechanical
lever that operates the switch, so that the coming train is now directed onto the dead
end track. As bad luck would have it, no one notices the change, and the train rolls
full speed onto the wrong track, crashing at the end of it. If any intuitive causal
judgments are to be taken seriously by philosophers of causality, it is definitely the
8 Another counterexample to Lewis’s theory of influence has been put forward by Tooley (2003, p. 409).
Instead of a particular example he considers a general situation involving three actual events C, D and
E. By assumption there is no relation of influence between C and E, but we assume that in the absence of
C, D does influence E, meaning that an appropriate range of alterations of D (D1, D2,…) is mapped onto
respective alterations of E (E1, E2,…). However, when C and any of the alterations of D occur jointly, the
result is always the same effect E. Tooley claims that in this case it is most natural to accept that C is a
cause of E that preempts D, and yet C does not satisfy Lewis’s condition.
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claim that moving the switch was a cause of the crash (although for sure other
causal factors, including the train’s motion, had to contribute to this regrettable
outcome as well). And yet a moment’s reflection can reveal that there is no possible
way we could claim that flipping the lever influences the crash, according to Lewis’s
definition of the notion of influence. You are free to imagine all sorts of alterations
of the actual way the bad guy moved the lever that fall short of making this move
unsuccessful—moving the lever at 5:05, moving it at 4:55, moving it with the left
hand, kicking it, moving it slowly and deliberately, moving it lightning fast, etc.—
and not a single one of these alterations would make the slightest difference in the
way the train crashed. Try as you might to change the way the lever was moved, and
you’ll never be able to get any change in the crash. There is simply no dependence
between the crash and the flipping of the switch other than the pure whether–
whether dependence.
But maybe not all hope is yet lost for Lewis’s analysis of causality in terms of
influence. Remember that the causal relation is not defined directly as the relation of
influence, but rather more flexibly as its ancestral. So couldn’t we find an
intermediate event between the moving of the lever and the train’s wreck such that
this event is influenced by the former and influences the latter? Let us try.
There is definitely an event that is connected to the movement of the lever via
Lewis’s relation of influence—it is namely the lateral movement of the switch rails
(these are two linked rails that lie between the diverging rails and can be moved into
one of the two positions to determine the direction in which the train goes). Surely
the time and manner of the pulling of the lever determines the time and manner of
the switch rails’ motion. But at this point the chain of influence stops dead. Again,
varying the time and manner of the motion of the switch rails does not in the least
affect the time and manner of the crash, nor the time and manner of any event that
involves the train passing through the switch.
You may point out that there are some special alterations of the actual movement
of the switch rails that are mapped into a dramatic alteration of the crash. Consider,
for instance, those alterations that leave the switch rails in the middle and inaccurate
position between two diverging tracks (supposing that the mechanism of the switch
allows for such a flawed execution of the change), and therefore cause the train to
derail on passing the switch. True, but this fact does not ensure that the corrected
definition of the relation of influence is satisfied, for at least two reasons. Firstly, this
mapping is still a degenerate one, as it maps several ‘incomplete’ movements of the
switch rail onto one and the same result: the early derailment. Secondly, and more
importantly, taking smaller and smaller alterations of the actual event we will end
up with the switch rail being put in the correct position, which leads to the same
crash as in reality. But, according to Kvart’s amendment, the pattern of influence
should be preserved even under arbitrarily small departures from the actual cause.
For that reason I don’t see any reasonable way to make Lewis’s definition work in
this case.
The railroad switch example goes in the same direction as the two counterex-
amples given by Kvart and Schaffer, but makes the case against Lewis’s theory of
influence even more compelling, due to its simplicity, the strength of the intuitions
on which its relies, and the fact that the when–when dependence is excluded
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naturally at the outset, without any need of artificial add-ons.9 Further advantages of
this example will be revealed in due course, but at this point let us already observe
that it can also cast doubts on one potential solution to the problem of how to define
causation, suggested by Schaffer at the end of his critical article (2001, p. 18).
Without elaborating, Schaffer makes a comment that the most promising way of
approaching causation is in terms of the relation of effluence that, roughly, involves
a process connection between the cause and the effect. Without knowing the details
of this proposal it is difficult to judge, but it seems to me that at least one natural
interpretation of Schaffer’s notion of effluence is in terms of the transfer of some
dynamical quantities (such as energy or momentum). Schaffer’s electrocution case
can be satisfactorily analyzed using the notion of effluence, because it is natural to
assume that there is a continuous physical process that connects the pressing of the
button and the electrocuting device.10 But this solution does not work in the railroad
case. The moving of the lever is connected neither by Lewis’s influence nor
Schaffer’s effluence to the resulting crash. No dynamical parameters that
characterize the shifting of the lever are relevant to the dynamical parameters of
the crash. On the other hand, the relationship of effluence certainly holds between
the coming train and its crash. Hence it seems that Schaffer’s suggested approach is
capable of delivering one correct verdict that the oncoming train was a cause of the
crash, but has difficulties with singling out another cause of it—namely the
changing of the switch. What distinguishes these two causes of the crash—the
movement of the train and the changing of the switch’s position—is that the latter
creates a necessary background condition for the crash, while the former initiates
the dynamical process that due to the ‘right’ conditions is able to lead to the final
outcome. But between the movement of the lever and the train’s crash there is a
long period of ‘dormancy’ in which no dynamical process takes place (other than
simply objects persisting in time) until the train arrives and is directed onto the dead
end track.
But it may be pointed out that my purported counterexample can be easily
dismissed, as it clearly displays the whether–whether dependence, and the existence
of this sort of dependence is arguably sufficient for the relation of influence to hold.
Lewis himself states explicitly that ‘‘the simplest sort of whether–whether
dependence, with only two different alterations of E [i.e. the effect], still qualifies
as one sort of pattern of influence’’ (2004, pp. 91–92), and later he adds that
‘‘absences can be among the unactualized alterations of a cause or effect that figure
in a pattern of influence’’ (ibid., p. 100).11 However, these claims are difficult to
9 While Schaffer’s counterexample seems to be equally simple and compelling, it nevertheless requires
some artificial additions to eliminate the whether-whether and when-when dependence of the electrocution
on the pressing of the button. No such addition is necessary in the example considered above. The when-
when dependence does not exist between the flipping of the switch and the train wreck, whereas the
whether-whether dependence can be easily eliminated by a back-up cause, as explained below.
10 On second thought, Schaffer’s claim can be questioned too. In a sense the pressing of the button acts in
a similar way to the flipping of the railroad switch: it closes an electric circuit, allowing the current to
flow from the source of electricity to the electrocuting device. The pressing itself is a mechanical process
whose physical parameters do not stand in any direct relation to the physical parameters of the
electrocution.
11 I am indebted to an anonymous referee for pressing this point.
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accept given his notion of influence. Lewis’s remarks don’t seem to square with
both the letter and spirit of his theory of influence. According to his earlier
stipulation, an alteration of an event is just a modified version of this event, or a
numerically distinct event which is nevertheless similar to it (the choice between
these two options depends on whether we consider the initial event to be fragile or
not). But how can the absence of an event be its version, or a closely resembling
counterpart of it? Lewis explains that when we suppose counterfactually that an
event C does not occur, we should ‘‘imagine that C is completely and cleanly
excised from history, leaving behind no fragment or approximation of itself’’ (ibid.,
p. 90). This, in my mind, speaks decisively against interpreting absences of events
as their alterations, and consequently against including whether–whether depen-
dence in the pattern of influence.12
Incidentally, it is worth noticing that Lewis’s own example showing how to
incorporate the whether–whether dependence into the broader influence pattern
differs significantly from the railroad switch case. Lewis notes that sometimes small
alterations of the cause are mapped into only two alterations of the effect (i.e. its
presence and absence). This type of ‘‘extreme funneling’’ can be illustrated with the
help of the following double prevention case: a fighter airplane escorting a bomber
shoots down an enemy airplane preventing it from preventing the bomber from
destroying the target. Some alterations of the shooting of the interceptor by the
escort are clearly mapped into an absence of the effect (if the escort fires and misses
the enemy plane by a millimeter, the interceptor will most probably shoot down the
bomber and the target will not be reached). But our current case is different. Small
alterations of the cause do not get mapped into anything other than the actual train
crash. Only a big alteration of the flipping of the switch (i.e. not flipping it at all) can
influence the outcome. Even if we granted to Lewis that alterations may contain
absences as their special cases, still his definition of the relation of influence
contains the phrase ‘‘not too distant’’ which is applied to the alterations of the cause,
but not of the effect. So in assessing whether the influence relation holds between
two events we are not allowed to consider absences of the purported cause, because
they count as too distant alterations.
But of course it is always possible to combine Lewis’s two approaches—the
earlier counterfactual whether–whether dependence approach and the latest one
based on the notion of influence—together in a disjunctive fashion, and thus achieve
the needed flexibility. Under such an approach preemption cases are accounted for
with the help of the relation of influence, while the cases exhibiting no influence but
the whether–whether dependence are still analyzable in terms of the counterfactual
dependence. Seemingly we lose nothing by this marriage, and we gain a lot.
However, the railroad switch example can be easily modified in order to block the
whether–whether dependence with the help of a good old redundant and preempted
cause. Will the Lewisians be able to deal with this modification using any of the
available strategies other than the influence approach?
12 A similar point is made in (Schwarz 2009, p. 145).
Causation Without Influence 11
123
4 Back to Preemption
Let us consider the following correction to the story about the bad guy flipping the
switch. Suppose that the terrorist cell responsible for planning the attack had
decided to play it safe and, unbeknownst to the first guy, sent along a backup
conspirator in order to observe the action of the first one. The idea is of course that if
bad guy number one fails to do the job, the second one is supposed to jump in and
move the switch. In this new set-up the whether–whether dependence between the
lever’s shifting and the train’s crash is broken, since had the first guy not moved the
switch, the second guy would have done this and the very same crash would have
occurred. But this scenario looks very similar to the early preemption case, as the
successful execution of the switch’s change by the first guy clearly obviates the need
of any action from the backup conspirator. Hence this case should be solvable with
the help of the ancestral of the relation of counterfactual dependence. But is it?13
To fix the ideas, let us discuss two variants of the backup scenario, reflecting two
different specific modi operandi of the second conspirator. In the first scenario,
which can be called an ‘early intervention’, the backup guy is supposed to wait until
just seconds after 5:00 PM, and if the main executor of the plot is nowhere to be
seen, the backup has to act immediately. According to the second possible modus
operandi (‘late intervention’), the backup plotter has to wait until just before 6:00
(the time of the train’s arrival at the switch), and if the switch is still not moved, he
is obliged to pull the lever. Let us start with the early intervention case.
In order for Lewis’s strategy to work, we have to find an intermediate event
between the actual pulling of the lever at 5:00 and the train’s wreck, such that this
event counterfactually depends on the pulling. But this is not an easy task. The
backup plotter is supposed to move the same lever at virtually the same time as the
actual executor. Hence whatever actual event following the moving of the lever we
consider, it is not true that had the first guy not moved the lever, this event would
not have happened. Unless we have grounds to believe that the second plotter would
have moved the lever in a significantly different way than his accomplice, we cannot
claim that any subsequent actual event depends counterfactually on the actual
moving of the lever. Thus Lewis’s strategy fails even before it can get off the
ground.
The late intervention case fares no better with this respect. True, now we can find
plenty of events such that had the lever’s shift at 5:00 PM not occurred, they would
not have occurred either. These are namely all the events involving the position of
the switch rails before 6:00 PM. However, because the backup guy is supposed to
act just a moment before the train’s arrival, the crash would have happened anyway,
so it does not depend counterfactually on any event earlier than 6:00 PM. On the
other hand, no event happening after the scheduled time of the backup intervention
is counterfactually dependent on the actual action of the first guy. Again, as in the
13 Of course we could assume from the outset that the backup assassin operates in the late pre-emption
mode. For instance, he might have installed a device which, upon the arrival of the train, moves the
switch in the required position if it is not already set in this position (see later in the main text). But it is
interesting to see that even the early pre-emption version does not admit the usual solution advocated by
Lewis in his earlier works.
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early intervention scenario, the backup plotter is supposed to move the same lever
and thus create the same condition of the switch, which together with the train’s
arrival leads to the same crash. So, for instance, it is not true that if the first guy had
not moved the lever, the train would not have rolled onto the dead end track, and
similarly for all subsequent events leading to the disaster.
A quick reflection reveals that nothing significant changes if we adopt a mid-time
intervention scenario. No matter what time t between 5:00 and 6:00 the backup
assassin chooses as the moment of his intervention, had the first guy failed to act at
5:00, it is always true that no event after t (including the final effect) is
counterfactually dependent on any event before t (including the actual cause), and
this fact makes it impossible for Lewis’s ancestral-of-counterfactual-dependence
definition to be satisfied. But why? What is it about this particular case of early
preemption that makes it different from the standard example with Suzy and Billy
throwing rocks at a bottle?
Recall that an early preemption variant of this story is that Billy, upon seeing
Suzy throwing her rock, decides not to throw his rock, but had she failed to throw it,
he would have shattered the bottle with his rock. In this case all we have to do is
choose a moment at which Billy gave up on his desire to strike the bottle, when
Suzy’s rock was still on its way to the target. Clearly, at this moment the presence of
Suzy’s rock in mid-flight is counterfactually dependent on her toss, and the
shattering is counterfactually dependent on the rock’s being on its way (given no
backtracking). But the situation with the railroad switch is not entirely analogous.
The reason for this is that the backup guy would initiate the process that goes
through the same channel that the actual process that started at 5:00 PM. Every
single event belonging to the possible backup process is qualitatively identical with
an appropriate event in the actual process. This sets the railroad switch example
apart from the Suzy and Billy case, in which each child uses his/her own channel
(different rocks and different trajectories) to bring about the same effect.
In order to make their situation more in line with the switch example, we would
have to imagine a scenario according to which Billy, upon seeing that Suzy decided
not to throw her rock, would jump to her, grab her rock from her hands and throw it
exactly the same way she actually did. But even in this case any delay in executing
Suzy’s intended throw would result in a different chain of events leading to the
cause, thus allowing for the standard solution to the early preemption case. A nice
feature of the switch example is that the causal process goes through the period of
‘dormancy’ (the switch’s being in the new position and waiting for the train to
arrive), where it can be assumed that each event in the temporal series is
qualitatively indiscernible from the previous one (for instance, the state of the
switch’s being in the dead-end-track position at 5:25 is qualitatively the same as the
state of the switch’s being in the dead-end-track position at 5:55).
The solution using the notion of fragility will not work here for the same reason
that the influence theory does not work, namely because the crash caused by the
backup terrorist would be exactly the same as the crash caused by the first plotter.
The only available strategy left is the solution based on the notion of quasi-
dependence. Notwithstanding Lewis’s and others’ doubts regarding this strategy, let
us notice that in this particular case it seems to work: after all, it is easy to imagine
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an exact intrinsic copy of the entire situation from the initial shift of the lever till the
train’s crash, without the backup conspirator. But in order to repel this last desperate
attack on our counterexample let us introduce a high-tech modification. Rather than
a human backup, let us imagine that the terrorists managed to plant a special device
that operates as follows: when the coming train reaches its detector, it sends a signal
to the switch, checking its position. If the position directed the train away from the
dead end track, the device would move the switch, otherwise it would remain idle.
Suppose, moreover, that the device sends a unique electric impulse to the switch
that no other electronic system can emulate. This signal leaves an ‘imprint’ on the
microstructure of the switch rails. In such a case any intrinsic copy of the actual
chain of events will have to posses this imprint, and therefore will have to contain
the device that acts as a backup. The counterfactual dependence between the
mechanical operation of the switch and the crash cannot be restored. Consequently,
there is no quasi-dependence between the cause and the effect. The case seems to be
closed.
5 The Neuronal Network Example
Since Lewis’s ‘Postscripts to ‘‘Causation’’’ (1986) it has become standard to use
artificially designed examples involving neuronal links in order to illustrate various
possible causal set-ups. This approach relieves us from the complications associated
with real-life cases that may obscure our view and draw attention from important
matters to irrelevant details. It turns out that it is relatively easy to design a situation
involving neuronal links that is analogous to the railroad switch example with
redundancy. All we have to do is to introduce a new type of neuron whose role is to
prepare normal neurons to fire when stimulated (we can call this preparation
‘priming’). On the diagram below the connection between neuron C1 and F, shown
by a line with a diamond at its end, represents such a priming link. When C1 fires F
becomes ready to receive a stimulating signal from D and to fire as a result of this
stimulation, but without priming F will not fire even when stimulated by D.
Moreover, we assume that another priming signal (such as the one received from




Now we can consider the following sequence of events: at t1 neuron C1 fires and
primes F, at t2 another priming neuron C2 fires, but this does not change the state of
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neuron F, and at some later time t3 neuron D fires a stimulating signal that in turn
causes F to fire and stimulate neuron E. Obviously D’s firing counts as a cause of
E’s firing, but so does the firing of C1, according to our pre-theoretical intuitions, for
C1 creates a necessary condition required for F to be able to pass the signal through
to neuron E. The firing of C2 in turn is a preempted cause of E. The simple
counterfactual analysis yields an incorrect verdict regarding C1, as there is no
counterfactual dependence between E and C1 (if C1 had not fired, F would have
been primed by C2, and D would have stimulated F to fire). But now we can observe
that none of the various strategies devised by Lewis to cope with different cases of
preemption will work in this case. The quasi-dependence solution fails in this case,
as it can be used to argue for the incorrect conclusion that the firing of C2 is a cause
of the firing of E. We have assumed that the firing of C2 does not change the state of
the already primed neuron F in any significant way. If that is the case, then we can
imagine an exact intrinsic copy of the sequence of events leading from the firing of
C2 to the firing of E with neuron C1 eliminated. In this situation there is obviously a
counterfactual dependence between the firing of E and the firing of C2, hence the
condition of quasi-dependence is satisfied for the firings of neurons C2 and E.
14
Finally, neither the fragility solution nor the most recent influence theory can
deliver the correct analysis of the entire situation. We can reasonably argue that the
relation of influence links the firing of D with the firing of E. This is due to the fact
that changes of the time of D’s firing and (presumably) of its intensity will yield
appropriate changes of the time and intensity of E’s firing. However, no such link
exists between the firing of C1 and the effect. As long as an alteration of the actual
firing of C1 takes place before t3 and its intensity does not fall below the threshold
required for F to be primed, this alteration will be mapped onto exactly the same
firing of neuron E as in actuality.
6 Causes and Conditions
One conceivable strategy to refute the above-mentioned examples and to save
Lewis’s analysis is to try to apply the distinction between direct causal factors and
causal conditions. It may be claimed that the firing of neuron C1 is not strictly
speaking a cause of the firing of E, as it creates only the prerequisite conditions. But
the conditions themselves are incapable of bringing about the effect unless a true
‘dynamical’ cause (in the form of the firing of neuron D) occurs. Regardless of the
plausibility of such a defense we have to note that it does not help much in
furthering Lewis’s views of causation, since his analysis of the simpler case without
the backup neuron C2 clearly implies that the firing of C1 is a cause of the firing of
E. Lewis himself insisted that the distinction between causal factors and causal
conditions does not carry much theoretical weight, and that it can be relegated
14 Lewis in (2004, p. 83) describes a similar counterexample to the quasi-dependence solution which is a
modification of the standard Suzy and Billy example. However, in order to consider a possible world in
which an intrinsic copy of the sequence from Billy’s throw to the shattering constitutes a causal chain,
Lewis has to invoke laws that allow ordinary objects to ‘‘jump’’ randomly at distances. On the other hand,
my example with priming neurons works perfectly well in the worlds with ordinary laws.
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entirely to the sphere of pragmatics. But I believe that we could, contra Lewis, make
this important distinction less nebulous and pragmatic with the help of some
theoretical concepts definable in the semantic framework of counterfactual logic.15
In my (Bigaj 2005) I have suggested that what distinguishes background
conditions from causes is that although the effect is (typically) counterfactually
dependent on both, a background condition is usually cotenable with the absence of
the effect while a cause is not. This fact can be expressed equivalently in the
requirement that for an event c to be a cause and not only a background condition of
e, it has to be true that if e had not occurred, c might not have occurred. Now I
believe that for various reasons this requirement may not be entirely acceptable, but
I maintain that a more flexible distinction can still be drawn.16 We could make the
distinction between background conditions and causes a matter of degree rather than
a yes or no issue, with the help of a simple possible-world comparison.
Let us take an exemplary case illustrating the distinction in question: the striking
of the match versus the presence of oxygen as a cause (or a condition) of the lighting
of the match. It is true that in the closest world in which there is no oxygen the
match will not light, precisely as in the case of the closest possible world in which
there is no striking. But we have good reasons to believe that there is an important
difference between the two cases: the worlds in which there is no oxygen in the
atmosphere surrounding the match seem to be more remote from the actual world
than the worlds in which there is no striking of the match. Thus it looks like a
reasonable criterion to accept that of two events c1 and c2 such that event e is
counterfactually dependent on either of them, c1 is more a genuine cause and c2
more a background condition if the closest not-c1-worlds are closer to the actual
world than the closest not-c2-worlds.
But now it can be observed that the firing of neuron C1 in our previous example
looks more like a genuine cause in comparison with typical background conditions.
Take, for instance, the fact that at t3 neuron F existed. True, if neuron F had not
existed at t3, E would not have fired, as there would have been a gap between
neurons D and E. However the existence of neuron F is not seen as a cause of the
firing of neuron E, but rather as its background condition. And now it is reasonable
to maintain that the world in which neuron F ceases to exist at t3 is more remote than
the world in which neuron C1 fails to fire. We don’t have to devise fancy criteria of
similarity between possible worlds, involving the distinction between big and small
miracles, in order to argue that this is the case. There are many natural scenarios that
involve the failure of C1 to fire—it may be due to some electrical interference from
the surrounding neuronal network, it may be because of a lack of some vital
chemical compound, etc. But to account for the non-existence of neuron F we would
15 Peter Menzies is of the same opinion. He tries to account for the difference between causes and
background condition using his concept of ‘difference-making in context’ (Menzies 2004).
16 My addition to Lewis’s definition of cause would work only under the assumption that backtracking is
allowed, for only in such a case we could say truthfully that if there was no effect, its (earlier) cause might
not have occurred. I believe that backtracking counterfactuals are perfectly legitimate in such contexts,
but I don’t have space here to consider this problem in detail. Another problem with my approach is that it
does not seem to work well under the assumption of indeternimism. For details and possible remedies see
(Bigaj 2005, pp. 607–610).
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have either to go far back in time to the moment when the entire neuronal network
was developed to make necessary adjustments, or imagine some super-natural way
of eliminating the existing neuron. On the other hand, the possible failure of neuron
C1 to fire seems to be on a par with the possible failure of neuron D to fire with
respect to their remoteness from the actual world, and therefore both actual firings
qualify as genuine causes. Hence the distinction between causes and background
conditions cannot help to repel the counterexample to Lewis’s analysis.17
7 Whither Counterfactual Analysis?
But how serious is the problem we have presented? I believe it is rather serious, due
to the fact that examples of causal links of the sort we have presented are quite
common in real life. Causation without influence is present in many situations that
we encounter in everyday life, and it also occurs commonly in science. To give a
few examples: you insert a bullet in an empty magazine of a revolver, and later
somebody accidentally shoots himself while cleaning the revolver. You move the
electric switch in the on position during a power outage, and later when the power is
restored the light bulb flashes. You dissolve a bit of salt in chemically pure H2O, and
later electric current is passed through it, electrocuting somebody. Inserting the
bullet, moving the switch, dissolving salt, all qualify as partial causes of later
appropriate events, and yet we cannot claim that they influence their effects in the
sense defined by Lewis. It seems that examples like these decisively falsify Lewis’s
latest attempt at a counterfactual theory of causation.
But they also pose a threat to earlier counterfactual analyses, since they admit a
simple modification that introduces a particularly recalcitrant type of asymmetric
redundancy. Thus, causation without influence but with redundancy seems to
undermine the entire program of the counterfactual analysis of causation. Yet before
we jump to conclusions let us recall that philosophers of science caution that
negative evidence counts against a given theory only if there are viable alternatives
to it that can accommodate this evidence.18 And it looks like the main competitors
of Lewis’s approach encounter similarly serious difficulties when dealing with the
cases of causality without influence (even without redundancy). To begin with, any
general regularity approach will have the usual problems with defending the claim
that the flipping of the switch implies the train’s crash, as there may be numerous
cases in which the railroad switch is changed and which are not followed by any
crash due to the absence of the train. John Mackie’s subtle version of the regularity
approach that uses the notion of an INUS condition may deal with this problem, as it
17 Yablo (2004) quotes Plato’s distinction between causes and enabling conditions, i.e. ‘‘conditions that
don’t produce the effect themselves but create a context in which something else can do so’’ (p. 119). It
looks like the firing of neuron C1 satisfies Yablo’s definition of enablers, as it is true that if D fired and C1
did not, neuron E would not fire. Hence it may be claimed that C1 is not a cause of E, but only enables D
to cause E. However, Yablo later admits that enablers are full-fledged causes due to the existence of the
counterfactual dependence between them and the effect, although they can be pragmatically
counterindicated as such.
18 See for instance (Thagard 1978).
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requires only that a cause is a necessary part of a sufficient condition, but it suffers
from the same setbacks as Lewis’s theory due to cases of redundancy (Mackie
1965).
One of the most serious alternatives to the counterfactual approach to causation is
the theory of causal processes based on the notion of the transfer of a conserved
quantity. In Wesley Salmon’s interpretation (accepted, with some modifications, by
Phil Dowe), a process leading from c to e transmits a conserved quantity if it
possesses the same amount of this quantity at all moments starting at c and ending at
e, and in addition the process does not interact causally with any other process in a
way that requires an exchange of that particular quantity.19 For Salmon and Dowe,
transmitting a conserved quantity in the above sense is the hallmark of causal
processes that distinguishes them from so-called ‘pseudo-processes’. But if we
apply this definition to the railroad switch example we have to note that no
conserved quantity is transferred from the pulling of the lever to the train’s crash.
The amount of energy, momentum, angular momentum that characterizes the
movement of the lever is not equal to the amount of energy, momentum, etc. that is
associated with the crash, nor is the latter in any way functionally dependent on the
former. The transfer does occur, but it stops when the switch rails are moved into
their new position, well before the arrival of the train.
Salmon-Dowe’s theory of causation cannot be rescued by an appeal to the notion
of causal interaction between processes. It may look like there are two interacting
processes involved: the process leading from the movement of the lever to the new
position of the switch rails, and the motion of the train. However, the definition of a
causal interaction clearly demands that there be an exchange of a conserved quantity
between two involved processes, and yet no such exchange is present in our case.
The train neither loses nor gains any significant amount of energy or momentum
upon passing the switch that would equal the gain or loss of energy/momentum of
the process leading from the movement of the lever to the shifting of the switch
rails. Hence the conserved quantity theory is clearly incapable of accounting for
cases similar to the railroad switch case.20
Dowe admits that there are cases of seemingly causal processes that don’t meet
his requirement of the transmission of a conserved quantity, such as cases of
causation by omission and prevention. His solution is to introduce the notion of
19 See (Salmon 1997; Dowe 2000b, 2007).
20 Salmon-Dowe’s theory of causation is also threatened by a type of cause that Krajewski (1997) calls
‘triggering causes’. A triggering cause is an event that initiates a release of previously accumulated
energy. For instance, by removing a supporting rock we can cause a boulder to roll down the slope and to
crash a tree in its path. However, the amount of energy/momentum spent for the removal of the obstacle
stands in no relation to the amount of energy/momentum used for crashing the tree. A triggering cause
releases potential energy that has been stored in an appropriate medium, and therefore is not connected by
the relation of the transfer of a conserved quantity with the effect. It can be noted that with respect to the
lack of a transfer of a conserved quantity triggering causes resemble causes used in the examples analyzed
in this article. The only difference is that triggering causes are connected with their effects by the when-
when dependence, for their occurrence is followed immediately (or after some fixed period of time) by
the main process leading to the effect, whereas the time of the occurrence of a ‘priming cause’ stands in
no fixed relation to the time of its effect. An example of a priming cause that is analogous to the
aforementioned boulder example would be the action of removing an obstacle in the path of the boulder
prior to an uncorrelated dislodging of the boulder.
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pseudo-causation that could cover the cases that the conserved quantity theory
cannot explain. He even formulates specific definitions of quasi-causation by
omission and by prevention in terms of his ‘genuine’ causal processes and
interactions.21 It is very likely that a similar strategy could be applied to the cases of
causation without influence. This suggests generally that we could always try to
explain away obstinate cases that defy our favorite theory of causation by inventing
for them a special category under the convenient umbrella of ‘pseudo-causation’.
Whether this would be the best way of rescuing Lewis’s latest theory of causation
from the quagmire of causation without influence remains to be seen. However, I
think that another more promising plan of action may be available for the Lewisians.
Lewis’s original theory of causation appears to be very well suited to deal with
cases such as the railroad switch case without redundancy, as our intuitive judgment
that they are indeed cases of causation is most likely based on the existence of the
counterfactual dependence between the cause and the effect. Lewis replaced his
stepwise counterfactual dependence theory with the influence theory in order to deal
with the problem of preemption, and the abundant cases of causation without
influence clearly prove that this was a step in the wrong direction. I believe that it
may be prudent to give up the influence approach in favor of the good old theory,
and to try again to tackle the real enemy, which is the problem of preemption
(redundant causation).22
So far all efforts to solve the preemption problem have been directed toward
finding one universal formula for the causal relation that would produce the right
answer in each particular case of redundant asymmetric causation. Thus the
standard is set very high. It may be noted that in analogous troublesome cases that
are encountered in science we are very often satisfied with much less ambitious
temporary solutions. In science it is customary to shield our favorite theories against
single and atypical counterexamples with all sorts of ‘idealizations’ or ceteris
paribus clauses. Why can’t the same be done with philosophical theories? Many
cases of redundant causation that philosophers are so eager to invent may be
claimed to belong to the category of non-standard, marginal cases that our theory
should not be required to explain directly. True, it would be ideal if we had a theory
21 Incidentally, Lewis himself applied a similar strategy in order to deal with causation by omission, as it
cannot be directly accommodated by his counterfactual theory due to the fact that omissions are (most
probably) not events. Lewis suggested that the special case of causation by omission may be treated
separately with the help of a special type of counterfactual (1986, pp. 189–193).
22 Another strategy of how to deal with the problem of preemption, not mentioned in this article, has
been briefly suggested by Field (2003, p. 452). The method recommended by Field is based on the
modification of the requirement of counterfactual dependence between the cause and the effect to include
cases of conditional counterfactual dependence. Field claims that it should be sufficient for causation to
occur if the effect is counterfactually dependent on the cause given that we fix certain facts. The main
problem is of course how to characterize generally the types of facts that are allowed to be fixed, without
making an implicit reference to the notion of cause. Field illustrates his method with the case of early
preemption, arguing that Suzy’s throw counts as a cause, because if we hold fixed the fact that Billy didn’t
throw, the window’s shattering does depend counterfactually on Suzy’s throw. However, in the case of
late preemption the situation is not so clear. We could argue either way that the shattering is
counterfactually dependent on Billy’s or Suzy’s throw when we fix that the other throw did not occur. A
more sophisticated version of the approach based on the conditional counterfactual dependence is
presented in (Yablo 2004).
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of causation that would be capable of delivering the correct analysis in every
imaginable scenario and set-up, but sometimes we have to settle for less. A much
more reasonable expectation in various cases of preemption is that we be able to
produce a theoretical explanation of why our intuitive, pre-theoretical judgments
depart from the verdict of our theory. Such an explanation may invoke for instance
an apparent asymmetry between the preempted and preempting causes that is not
taken into account by our theory due to the context-dependency of this asymmetry.
If we were able to find in each known case of preemption a reasonable and
principled basis of our judgment that selects one event as the preempting cause and
another as the preempted one, then we should be satisfied with that sort of
explanation even if this basis varied slightly in each case and thus was incapable of
being incorporated into our general theory.23
Let me clarify these sketchy remarks a bit using the late preemption case as an
example. As we have seen, neither Suzy’s nor Billy’s throw taken separately is
counterfactually connected with the shattering of the bottle; however their
disjunction is. So, according to the basic counterfactual analysis, only the whole
disjunction of both events counts as a cause of the shattering. But now we should
observe that the situation is not fully symmetric with respect to both disjuncts. This
can be seen by comparing two closest possible worlds: one in which Suzy’s throw is
present but Billy’s throw is absent, and the other one in which it is the other way
around. Although in both worlds the required effect occurs, in the first world it is
virtually identical with the actual shattering of the bottle, while in the second world
the shattering differs in certain respects from the actual one due to the fact that in
this particular world it is Billy’s stone and not Suzy’s which crashes the bottle. This
asymmetry can be used to explain our inclination to single out one throw rather than
the other as a cause of the shattering. Of all the contributing components of the
disjunctive cause we tend to select the one whose absence would lead to the greatest
modification of the effect, and this explains why we think it was Suzy’s throw which
caused the shattering.
But in other cases the asymmetry between the components of a disjunctive cause
may have an altogether different basis. As we have seen, the potential causes in the
case of causation without influence but with redundancy are symmetrical with
respect to their power to modify the effect. In the neuronal network example
discussed earlier, the firing of neuron F is counterfactually dependent on the
disjunction of the firings of two priming neurons C1 and C2, but it is not dependent
on any separate firing. Moreover, the firing of F would be qualitatively the same,
even if the intermediary neuron E was primed by any of the two neurons C1 or C2
individually. In this case the asymmetry which can explain our preference of C1
over C2 is a temporal one. We pick the earlier of the two firings as a cause, because
23 I believe that this suggestion goes in the same general direction as the proposal made by Hall (2004).
Hall stresses that a theoretical account of causality does not have to recover all of our firm pre-theoretical
intuitions. Rather, we should aim at construing the notion of causation in such a way that it can serve a
useful theoretical purpose—for instance, helping us understand better the nomological structure of the
world. According to Hall, cases of preemption teach us something important about causation—that it




we believe that the later firing did not make any significant change to the state of the
already primed neuron E.
I suppose that similar asymmetry-based explanations can be provided in virtually
all known cases of redundant causation, including trumping preemption. If this is
correct, perhaps we should not worry extensively about the fact that the elementary
counterfactual theory of causation does not immediately deliver the expected results
in some of these cases. As long as the explanation of such a failure given in terms of
the asymmetry between the components of the disjunctive cause is not blatantly ad
hoc, this strategy of saving our best theory of causation from refutation should be
seen as methodologically acceptable.
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